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Abstract: In this paper, I discuss the actual conditions and determinants of the saving 
behavior and wealth holdings of the aged in China, with emphasis on the impact of 
bequest motives thereon, using micro data from the 2009 “Survey of Living Preferences 
and Satisfaction” (urban households) and the 2010 “Survey of Living Preferences and 
Satisfaction” (rural households), which were conducted in February 2009 and January 
2010, respectively, as  part of the  Global
 Center of Excellence  (GCOE) Program  on 
“Behavioral  Macro-dynamics  based  on  Surveys  and  Experiments”  of  the  Graduate 
School  of  Economics  and  the  Institute  of  Social  and  Economic  Research  of  Osaka 
University.    I  found  that  bequest  motives  are  strong  in  China,  with  more  than  87 
percent of respondents in urban areas, more than 75 percent in rural areas, and more 
than 85 percent in the country as a whole having a bequest motive, that these bequests 
are motivated primarily by altruism, that there is little evidence that aged households in 
China dissave (decumulate their wealth), and that altruistic and selfish bequest motives, 
especially the latter, increase the saving (or reduce the dissaving) of aged households. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
As is well-known, China’s household saving rate is high by international standards.  
There  are  many  motives  for  which  households  save,  but  broadly  speaking  we  can 
classify them into life-cycle motives and bequest motives.      In this paper, I discuss the 
actual conditions and determinants of the saving behavior and wealth holdings of the 
aged in China, with emphasis on the impact of bequest motives thereon, using micro 
data from the 2009 “Survey of Living Preferences and Satisfaction” (urban households) 
and the 2010 “Survey of Living Preferences and Satisfaction” (rural households), which 
were conducted in February 2009 and January 2010, respectively, as part of the Global
 
Center  of  Excellence  (GCOE)  Program  on  “Behavioral  Macro-dynamics  based  on 
Surveys and Experiments” of the Graduate School of Economics and the Institute of 
Social and Economic Research of Osaka University.    In so doing, I try to shed light on 
which model of household behavior (the selfish life cycle model, the altruism model, or 
the dynasty model) applies in China.   
 
The  issue  of  which  model  of  household  behavior  applies  in  the  real  world  is  an 
important  and  timely  one  that  has  important  implications.    It  is  of  interest  to 
economists because it sheds light on which model of household behavior applies in the 
real world, and it is of interest to policymakers because it determines whether household 
saving rates will decline as the population ages, whether expansionary fiscal policies 
such  as  tax  cuts  are  effective  in  stimulating  consumption,  whether  government 
redistributional policies such as pay-as-you-go social security system have real effects 
on the macro economy, and whether wealth disparities are passed on from generation to - 2 - 
 
generation.     
 
There have been many previous studies of the saving behavior of the aged in Japan and 
the United States (see Hurd (1990), Horioka (2010), and Kan and Horioka (2010) for 
useful surveys of the previous literature).    For example, Horioka (2010) shows that 
Japanese  retired  aged  dissave  and  that  even  the  working  aged  dissave,  at  least  at 
advanced ages, and points out that since 2000 there has been a sharp increase in the 
dissaving of the retired aged due to reductions in social security benefits, increases in 
consumption expenditures, and increases in taxes and social insurance premiums, which 
is consistent with the life-cycle model and suggests that this model is highly applicable 
in the case of Japan.   
 
There have been fewer previous studies of the impact of bequest motives on the saving 
behavior  of  the  aged.    For  example,  Dekle  (1990)  analyzes  previously  unanalyzed 
cross sectional data with direct information on total wealth and other characteristics and 
using the number of living children as a proxy for the strength of the bequest motive 
finds that the Japanese aged households are not decumulating their wealth but that the 
independent  aged  households  with  a  bequest  motive  have  higher  wealth  than  those 
without a bequest motive.    Ohtake and Horioka (1994) analyze micro data from a 
Japanese government survey and using the presence of living children as a proxy for the 
strength of the bequest motive find that the aged households in Japan are decumulating 
their assets and that the speed of decumulation of housing assets of the retired aged 
households with a bequest motive is slower than that of those without a bequest motive 
by 3 to 4 percentage points.  Alessie, Lusardi, and Kapteyn (1995) analyze panel data - 3 - 
 
for the Netherlands and find using information on whether or not the respondent has 
thought  about  leaving  a  bequest  that  there  is  little  evidence  of  decumulation  until 
advanced ages and that the aged households with a bequest motive have significantly 
higher wealth than those without a bequest motive.    Horioka, et  al. (2002) analyze 
micro data from a household survey conducted by the former Institute of Posts and 
Telecommunications Policy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
and  find  that  aged  households  in  Japan  are  dissaving  and  that  whether  or  not  the 
respondent intends to leave a bequest and the planned amount of the bequest both have 
a positive and significant  impact  on their rate  of accumulation.    By  contrast, Hurd 
(1987) analyzes micro data from the Retirement History Survey, and using the presence 
of living children as a proxy for the strength of the bequest motives finds that aged 
households in the United States are dissaving but that bequest motives do not have a 
significant impact on saving.    He speculates that this is because households with living 
children  prefer  spending  money  on  their  children’s  consumption  and  education  to 
leaving an inheritance to their children or because the bequest motive variable functions 
as a proxy for wealth.   
 
Thus, the evidence is somewhat mixed, but most previous studies find that the aged 
households are decumulating their wealth, and all authors except Hurd (1987) find that 
bequest motives have a positive and significant impact on saving.     
 
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, I discuss three theoretical models of 
household  behavior  with  emphasis  on  their  implications  for  bequest  motives  and 
household  saving  behavior;  in  Section  3,  I  describe  the  data  sources  used  in  my - 4 - 
 
analysis; in Section 4, I define the variables used in my analysis; in Section 5, I describe 
the estimation model; in Section 6, I present descriptive statistics on the variables used 
in the analysis with emphasis on the saving behavior of the aged and bequest motives; 
in Section 7, I present my estimation results; and in Section 8, I summarize my findings 
and discuss the policy implications of my findings. 
 
To preview my findings, bequest motives are strong in China, with more than 87 percent 
of respondents in urban areas, more than 75 percent in rural areas, and more than 85 
percent  in  the  country  as  a whole having  a bequest  motive, and these bequests are 
motivated primarily by altruism.    Moreover, I found that there is little evidence that 
aged  households  in  China  dissave  (decumulate  their  wealth)  but  that  altruistic  and 
selfish  bequest  motives,  especially  the  latter,  increase  the  saving  (or  reduce  the 
dissaving) of aged households. 
 
2.  Theoretical Models of Household Behavior and Their Implications for Bequest 
Motives and for Household Saving Behavior 
 
In this section, I briefly describe three theoretical models of household behavior and the 
implications of these models for bequest motives and for household saving behavior.     
 
a.  Implications for Bequest Motives 
In this subsection, we discuss the implications of each theoretical model of household 
behavior for bequest motives. 
 
(1) The selfish life-cycle model: This model assumes that parents are selfish and do not - 5 - 
 
care about their children.    Thus, if this model is valid, parents will not leave any 
bequests at all to their children or will leave bequests only if their children provide 
something in return such as co-residence, care, and/or financial support during old 
age.    One version of this model is the “strategic bequest motive” of Bernheim, 
Shleifer, and Summers (1985).    According to this theory, both parents and children 
are selfish and the strategic bequest motive is regarded as payment for the in-kind 
services provided by their children.    Another version of this model is proposed by 
Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), who assume that parents make an implicit annuity 
contract with their children in order to cope with uncertainty concerning the timing 
of their death.    Since both the strategic bequest motive and the bequest as implicit 
annuity contract motive are based on the selfish life-cycle model, they are called the 
bequest as exchange motive. 
 
(2) The  altruism  model:  This  model  assumes  that  parents  harbor  intergenerational 
altruism toward their children.    Thus, if this model is valid, parents will leave a 
bequest  to  their  children  regardless  of  whether  or  not  their  children  provide 
something in return.    Becker (1974, 1981, 1991) and Stark (1995) provide the best 
exposition of this model.       
 
(3) The dynasty model: This model assume that parents wish to perpetuate their family 
line or family business, and thus if this model is valid, parents will leave a bequest 
to their children only if their children carry on the family line or the family business 
(see Chu (1991)).    Thus, in this model, bequests are a quid pro quo for taking over 
the family line or the family business.     - 6 - 
 
 
As we have seen, the various theoretical models of household behavior have very 
different implications for bequest motives.     
 
b.  Implications for Household Saving Behavior 
 
I now discuss the implications of each theoretical model of household behavior for 
household saving behavior using age-wealth profiles and age-saving profiles.    Figure 1 
shows the age-wealth profiles implied by each of the three theoretical models, while 
Figure 2 shows the age-saving profiles implied by each of the three theoretical models.   
The vertical axis of Figure 1 is the stock of household net worth and the vertical axis of 
Figure 2 is the flow of household saving (change in net worth), while the horizontal axis 
of both figures is the age of the household head.    R is the household’s retirement age, 
and L is the household head’s age at death or his or her lifespan. 
 
(1) The selfish life-cycle model with no bequests: Individuals who adhere to the selfish 
life-cycle  model  with  no  bequests  should  save  until  retirement  in  order  to 
accumulate  enough  to  finance  living  expenses  during  retirement,  should  finance 
their living expenses during retirement using their own savings only, and should 
leave no bequests to their children.    Thus, their age-wealth profile should be OAL 
in Figure 1, and their age-saving profile should be FHJM in Figure 2, saving a 
positive amount until retirement and decumulating (dissaving) after retirement so 
that their wealth is precisely exhausted at death. 
 - 7 - 
 
(2) The selfish life-cycle model with bequests: Individuals who adhere to the selfish 
life-cycle  model  with  bequests  should  save  until  retirement  in  order  to  save  up 
enough to finance living expenses during retirement, as in the case of the previous 
model, but they should finance their living expenses during retirement using only 
financial (or in-kind) assistance from their children and should leave a bequest to 
their children at death as a quid pro quo for this assistance.    Thus, their age-wealth 
profile should be OACL in Figure 1, and their age-saving profile should be FHIKN 
in Figure 2.    Thus, their wealth accumulation (saving) behavior until retirement 
will  be  identical  to  the  life-cycle  model  without  bequests,  but  their  wealth 
accumulation  (saving)  behavior  after  retirement  will  very  different,  with  no 
decumulation  of  assets  (no  dissaving)  until  death  because  their  living  expenses 
during  retirement  are  financed  by  financial  (and  in-kind)  assistance  from  their 
children but a sudden decumulation of all of their wealth at the time of death in 
order to leave a bequest to their children. 
 
(3) The altruism model: Individuals who adhere to the altruism model should save more 
before retirement because they need to save not only to finance their living expenses 
during retirement but also because they want to leave an unrequited bequest to their 
children.    Thus,  the  age-wealth  profile  of  those  adhering  to  the  altruism  model 
should  be  OBD  in  Figure  1,  and  their  age-saving  profile  should  be  EGJMN  in 
Figure  2.    Those  adhering  to  the  altruism  model  should  save  more  than  those 
adhering to a selfish life-cycle model with or without bequests until retirement (as 
shown by the steeper slope of the age-wealth profile in Figure 1 and the higher level 
of the age-saving profile in Figure 2), but after retirement, those adhering to the - 8 - 
 
altruism model should decumulate (dissave) at the same rate as those adhering to the 
selfish life-cycle model with no bequests, as shown by the identical slopes of the 
age-wealth profiles in Figure 1 and the identical heights of the age-saving profiles in 
Figure 2.    The difference is that those adhering to the altruism model should leave 
a positive bequest, as a result of which their age-wealth profile does not fall to zero 
and their age-saving profile becomes sharply negative at the time of death. 
 
(4) The dynasty model: The case of the dynasty model is virtually identical to the case 
of  the  altruism  model  because  children  do  not  provide  financial  (or  in-kind) 
assistance to parents during retirement and because parents leave a bequest, with the 
only difference being that there is a quid pro quo for the bequest in the case of the 
dynasty model (namely, taking over the family life or the family business) but not in 
the case of the altruism model. 
 
Turning  finally  to  the  implications  of  the  three  theoretical  models  of  household 
behavior for the wealth holdings of retirees, wealth holdings should be lowest for 
retirees adhering to the selfish life-cycle model with no bequest motive and higher for 
the  other  three  models.    As  drawn  in  Figure  1,  household  wealth  is  highest  for 
retirees adhering to the altruism and dynasty models during the early retirement years 
and highest for retirees adhering to the selfish life-cycle model with bequests in the 
later retirement years.    Thus, we can ascertain which theoretical model of household 
behavior applies in China by looking at bequest motives and at the impact of bequest 
motives on the household saving behavior of retirees. 
 
3.  Data Sources - 9 - 
 
 
In this section, I describe the three data sources used in this analysis. 
 
a.  “Survey of Living Preferences and Satisfaction” (urban households) 
The  “Survey  of  Living  Preferences  and  Satisfaction”  (urban  households)  (hereafter 
referred to as the ”Urban Survey”) was conducted in January 2009 as part of the Global
 
Center  of  Excellence  (GCOE)  Program  on  “Behavioral  Macro-dynamics  based  on 
Surveys and Experiments” of the Graduate School of Economics and the Institute of 
Social and Economic Research of Osaka University.    1380 respondents aged 20 to 69 
living  in  six  major  cities  (Shanghai,  Beijing,  Chengdu,  Guangzhou,  Shenyang,  and 
Wuhan) of China were selected at random and interviewed face-to-face. 
 
b.  “Survey of Living Preferences and Satisfaction” (rural households) 
The “Survey of Living Preferences and Satisfaction” (rural areas) (hereafter referred to 
as the “Rural Survey”) was conducted in January 2010 and used a questionnaire similar 
to the “Urban Survey.”  1000 respondents aged 20 to 69 living in twelve rural areas of 
China (Zhuzhou, Xiangtan, and Hengyang of Hunan province, Xiaogan, Jingzhou, and 
Huanggang of Hubei province, Nanchong, Yibin, and Dazhou of Sichuan province and 
Jingzhou, Fushun and Liaoyang of Liaoning province) were selected at random and 
interviewed face-to-face. 
 
Both surveys collected a variety of detailed information on respondents such as their 
bequest motives, age, sex, marital status, occupation, educational attainment, number of 




I used the sample of single (widowed or divorced) males and married couples who have 
at least one child, whose (male) household head is 60 years old or older and retired, and 
for whom all of the necessary information is available in the case of the Urban Survey 
and the same sample in the case of the Rural Survey except that households with retired 
as well as working (male) household heads were included in the sample since most rural 
household heads continue working even after the age of 60. 
 
c.  “Main Indicators of Real Estate in 35 Large and Medium-sized Cities” (2008) 
Data on the sales price of condominiums per square meter by city in China were taken 
from this data source.    These data are included in Chapter 5 of the 2009 edition of the 
Statistics Yearbook of China (National Bureau of Statistics of China (2009)).   
 
4.  Variable Definitions   
 
In this section, I define the dependent and explanatory variables used in my analysis. 
 
The dependent variables I use are as follows:   
   
LnNW (the log of net worth)   
LnFINA (the log of net financial assets) 
LnFIXA (the log of net housing assets) 
 - 11 - 
 
The  Urban  and  Rural  Surveys  collect  detailed  information  on  the  composition  of 
respondents’ financial assets and housing assets.    Respondents were asked:   
①  How much is the present appraised value of all housing and other real estate that the 
entire household owns? (If you are a student, please answer about the housing and 
other real estate that your parents’ entire household owns.)   
②  How much is the outstanding balance of financial assets (saving, stocks, insurance, 
etc.) of your entire household? 
③  Do you currently have any liabilities or debts?    Liabilities or debts include housing 
loans. 
(i)  No liabilities or debts 
(ii)  Have liabilities or debts    (continue to  ④) 
④    What is the current balance of your housing loans? 
⑤    What is the current balance of your liabilities or debts other than housing loans? 
 
NW  (net  worth) was  defined as  the sum  of  the current  balance of fixed assets  and 
financial assets net of liabilities and was calculated as  ①＋②―④－⑤. 
 
FINA (net financial assets) was defined as the current balance of financial assets net of 
non-housing loans and was calculated as  ②－④. 
 
FIXA (net fixed assets) was defined as the current balance of fixed assets net of housing - 12 - 
 
loans and was calculated as  ①－③. 
 
The explanatory variables I used are as follows: 
 
BEQUEST (bequest motive dummy) 
In both  the Urban and  Rural  Surveys,  respondents  were asked  how they  feel  about 
leaving an inheritance to their children.    The options given were as follows: 
1.  I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) no matter what. 
2.  I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) if they provide care (including 
nursing care) during old age. 
3.  I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) only if they provide financial 
assistance during old age. 
4.  I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) only if they carry on the family 
business. 
5.  I do not plan to make special efforts to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) but 
will leave whatever is left over. 
6.  I do not plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) under any circumstances 
because doing so may reduce their will to work. 
7.  I do not plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) under any circumstances 
because I want to use my wealth myself. 
8.  I want to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) but I won’t because I don’t have - 13 - 
 
the financial capacity to do so. 
 
BEQUEST (five bequest motive dummies)   
I used the following five dummy variable pertaining to bequest motives: ABEQUEST, a 
dummy variable that equals one if parents plan to leave an inheritance to their child(ren) 
no matter what and zero otherwise, SBEQUEST1, a dummy variable that equals one if 
parents plan to leave an inheritance to their child(ren) if they provide care (including 
nursing care) during old age and zero otherwise, SBEQUEST2, a dummy variable that 
equals one if parents plan to leave an inheritance to their child(ren) only if they provide 
financial assistance during old age and zero otherwise, DBEQUEST, a dummy variable 
that equals one if parents plan to leave an inheritance to their child(ren) only if they 
carry on the family business and zero otherwise, UBEQUEST, a dummy variable that 
equals one if parents do not plan to make special efforts to leave an inheritance to their 
child(ren) but will leave whatever is left over and zero otherwise.    The default category 
is those not planning to leave a bequest at all (options 6, 7, and 8).  (I will sometimes 
refer to the first four motives collectively as “intended bequest motives” and the fifth 
motive as an “unintended bequest motive.”) 
 
HAGE (the age of the male household head) 
 
BEQUEST*HAGE (the cross-product of the five bequest dummies and HAGE) 
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INCOME (parental income) 
INCOME is the annual income of the respondent and his or her spouse (if any)  in units 
of million yuan. 
 
ADIFF (the age difference between husband and wife) 
ADIFF is calculated by subtracting the wife’s age from the husband’s age.    If the male 
household head is unmarried, ADIFF is set equal to zero. 
 
MARRY (a dummy for the male household head’s marital status) 
MARRY is a dummy variable that equals one if the male household head is married and 
living with his spouse and zero otherwise. 
 
HEDU (the male household head’s educational attainment) 
In the Urban Survey, HEDU is defined as the number of years of schooling received by 
the male household head.    It was set equal to three if the male household head did not 
receive  a  primary  education  or  dropped  out  of  primary  school,  to  six  if  his  final 
educational attainment was graduation from primary school, to nine if he graduated 
from junior high school, to 10.5 if he received some high school education but did not 
graduate, to twelve if he graduated from high school, to thirteen if he received some 
junior college education without obtaining a degree, to fourteen if he graduated from a 
junior  college with  an  associate’s  degree or  received some  education  at  a four-year 
college  without  obtaining  a  bachelor’s  degree,  to  sixteen  if  he  graduated  from  a - 15 - 
 
four-year college with a bachelor’s degree, to 17.5 if he did some post-graduate study 
without obtaining a master’s degree, to eighteen if he received a master’s degree, to 19.5 
if he did some doctoral studies without obtaining a doctoral degree, and to twenty-one if 
he received a doctoral degree.    Respondents who chose “I don’t know” were dropped 
from the sample.   
 
Since  respondents  were  given  different  options  in  the  question  about  educational 
attainment in the rural survey, HEDU was set equal to zero if the male household head 
is illiterate, to three if he did not receive a primary education or dropped out of primary 
school, to six if his final educational attainment was graduation from primary school, to 
nine if he graduated from junior high school, to twelve if he graduated from high school, 
to fourteen if he received some education at a four-year college without obtaining a 
bachelor’s degree, to sixteen if he graduated from a four-year college with a bachelor’s 
degree,  and  to  eighteen  if  he  received  a  master’s  degree  or  a  doctoral  degree.   
Respondents who chose “I don’t know” were dropped from the sample. 
 
WORK (a dummy variable for the employment status of the male household head) 
In both the Urban and Rural Surveys, respondents were asked which of the following 
choices corresponds to their occupation and their spouse’s occupation: 
1. Clerical worker (general, business-related, etc.) 
2. Sales worker (retail shop owner, sales clerk, sales representative, etc.) 
3. Managerial worker (government or company worker with the rank of section chief or - 16 - 
 
higher, member of the board of directors, etc.)   
4. Professional or technical worker (teacher, doctor, engineer, writer, etc.) 
5. Service worker (hairdresser, waiter, waitress, taxi driver, security guard, etc.) 
6. Blue-collar worker (carpenter, repairperson, factory worker, etc.) 
7. Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 
8. Housewife or househusband   
9. Student 
10. Retired (excluding housewife and househusband) 
11. Unemployed (excluding for housewife and househusband) 
12. Other   
 
WORK is a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent chose options 1 to 7 and 
zero if the respondent chose options 8 to 11.  Respondents who chose options 12 were 
dropped from the sample. However, this  variable was  not  included when the  urban 
sample  was  used  because  I  confined  the  sample  to  households  in  which  the  male 
household head is retired. 
 
RR (housing price index) 
RR is a housing price index calculated as the average sales price of condominiums per 
square meter in each city divided by the average income of households with a male 
household head aged 60 years old or older in that city.    However, this variable was not - 17 - 
 
included when using the rural sample or the full sample because data on the sale price of 
condominiums per square meter are not available in the case of rural areas. 
 
RURAL (rural dummy) 
RURAL is a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is a rural household and 
zero  otherwise  (i.e.,  if  the  respondent  is  an  urban  household).    This  variable  was 
included only when the full sample was used. 
 
5.  Estimation Model   
 
In  this  section,  I  describe  the  estimation  model  used  in  my  analysis.    I  use  the 
following estimation model: 
 
In(NW)= a + b(BEQUEST) + c(HAGE) + d(BEQUEST*HAGE) + e(ADIFF) 
+ f(INCOME) +  ｇ*X     
                                             (X: other explanatory variables) 
 
Regarding the impact of the five bequest dummies, we showed in section 3 that retirees 
with some kind of bequest motive will hold more wealth than retirees not planning to 
leave  a  bequest,  with  retirees  planning  to  leave  a  bequest  for  altruistic  or  dynastic 
reasons (ABEQUEST and DBEQUEST, respectively) holding the most wealth in the 
early  retirement  years  and  retirees  planning  to  leave  a  bequest  for  selfish  reasons 
(SBEQUEST1 and SBEQUEST2) holding the most wealth in the later retirement years.   - 18 - 
 
However, since retirees planning to leave bequests for altruistic reasons will leave a 
bequest no matter what whereas retirees planning to leave a bequest for dynastic and 
selfish reasons will not  leave a bequest unless their children fulfill their end of the 
bargain,  the wealth holdings  of  retirees  planning to  leave  a bequest  for dynastic or 
selfish reasons will tend to be lower than that of retirees planning to leave bequests for 
altruistic reasons.    Finally, retirees who do not plan to make special efforts to leave an 
inheritance to their child(ren) and who plan to leave whatever is left over (UBEQUEST) 
would be expected to hold less wealth than retirees with a stronger bequest motive for 
obvious reasons. 
 
Regarding the impact of parental income (INCOME), if parents’ own income is higher, 
they should be able to accumulate more wealth.    Thus, the impact of parental income 
should be positive. 
 
Regarding the impact of the age of the male household head (AGEH), the life-cycle 
model predicts that the aged households will decumulate their wealth after retirement so 
the impact of age should be negative. 
 
Regarding the impact of the cross-product of BEQUEST and AGEH, the coefficient of 
this variable shows how much faster or slower aged households who have a bequest 
motive  accumulate  or  decumulate  assets  than  aged  households  who  do  not  have  a 
bequest motive.    Since we would expect aged households with a bequest motive to 
accumulate  assets  more  rapidly  or  decumulate  assets  less  rapidly  than  the  aged 
households without a bequest motive, we would expect the impact of the cross-product - 19 - 
 
of BEQUEST and AGEH to be positive.     
 
Regarding the impact of the  age difference between husband and wife (ADIFF), its 
impact on wealth should be positive because the couple’s retirement span will be longer 
and the couple will require more wealth to finance living expenses during retirement, 
the larger is the age difference between husband and wife. 
   
Regarding the impact of housing prices (RR), when housing prices are higher relative to 
household  income,  a  house  of  a  given  size  will  cost  more  and  thus  (assuming  the 
demand for housing is relatively price-inelastic) aged households would be expected to 
hold more housing assets.    Thus, the impact of housing prices should be positive. 
 
Regarding the impact of the rural dummy (RURAL), aged households who live in rural 
areas would presumably hold less wealth for living expenses during old age because 
most of them continue working even in old age and because consumer prices are much 
lower in rural areas.    Thus, the impact of the rural dummy should be negative.   
   
6.  Descriptive Statistics 
 
In this section, I present descriptive statistics on the variables used in the analysis with 
emphasis on saving behavior and bequest motives. 
 
a.  Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis for urban, rural, - 20 - 
 
and  all  households,  and  as  can  be  seen  from  this  table,  the  proportion  of  aged 
households  that  plan  to  leave  an  inheritance  to  their  children  no  matter  what  (an 
altruistic bequest motive) is 33.3 percent in urban areas, 30.7 percent in rural areas, and 
32.5 percent in the country as a whole.  The proportion of aged households that plan to 
leave an inheritance to their children if they provide care (including nursing care) during 
old age (a selfish or exchange-type bequest motive) is 11.8 percent in urban areas, 7.9 
percent in rural areas, and 10.6 percent in the country as a whole.    The proportion of 
aged households that plan to leave an inheritance to their children only if they provide 
financial assistance during old age (another selfish or exchange-type bequest motive) is 
3.3 percent in urban areas, 5.3 percent in rural areas, and 3.9 percent in the country as a 
whole.    Thus, aged households who have one or the other selfish or exchange-type 
bequest motive is 15.1 percent in urban areas, 13.2 percent in rural areas, and 14.5 
percent in the country as a whole.    The proportion of aged households that plan to 
leave  an  inheritance  to  their  children  only  if  they  carry  on  the  family  business  (a 
dynastic bequest motive) is 6.9 percent in urban areas, 5.3 percent in rural areas, and 6.4 
percent in the country as a whole.    The proportion of aged households that do not plan 
to make special efforts to leave an inheritance to their children but will leave whatever 
is left over is 32.1 percent in urban areas, 31.6 percent in rural areas, and 31.9 percent in 
the country as whole.    Thus, the proportion of aged households with a bequest motive 
is  87.4  percent  in  urban  areas,  75.5  percent  in  rural  areas,  and  85.3  percent  in  the 
country as a whole.    It seems that the Chinese aged have a strong bequest motive and 
that bequest motives are somewhat stronger in rural areas than in urban areas.   
 
b.  Data on Wealth Holdings by Bequest Motive - 21 - 
 
Table 2 presents data on average holdings of net worth, net financial assets, and net 
fixed assets of aged households by bequest motive for urban, rural, and all households.   
In  urban  areas  and  in  the  country  as  a  whole,  aged  households  with  some  kind  of 
intended bequest motive (the first four motives)    have much higher holdings of all 
types  of  assets  than  households  with  an  unintended  bequest  motive  (motive  5)  and 
households not planning to leave an inheritance at all (motive 6).    For example, aged 
households  that  plan  to  leave  an  inheritance  to  their  children  only  if  they  provide 
financial assistance during old age (a selfish or exchange-type bequest motive) have the 
highest net worth and net fixed assets and the second highest net financial assets of any 
bequest motive (the fourth highest net financial assets of any bequest motive in the case 
of  urban  households).    Aged  households  that  plan  to  leave  an  inheritance  to  their 
children no matter what (an altruistic bequest motive) have the highest net financial 
assets and the second highest net worth and net fixed assets of any bequest motive.  
Aged households that plan to leave an inheritance to their children only if they provide 
care (including nursing care) during old age (another selfish or exchange-type bequest 
motive) have the third highest net worth, net financial assets, and net fixed assets (with 
the only exception being that they have they have the second highest net financial assets 
in the case of urban households), and those who plan to leave an inheritance to their 
children only if they carry on the family business (a dynastic bequest motive) have the 
fourth highest net worth, net financial assets, and net fixed assets (with the only being 
that they have the third highest net financial assets in the case of urban households).     
 
In rural areas, the patterns are less clear (perhaps because the sample size is too small), 
with aged households with an unintended bequest motive having higher net worth and - 22 - 
 
net fixed assets than aged households with an intended bequest motive, but households 
with  an  altruistic  bequest  motive  have  the  highest  net  financial  assets,  the  second 
highest net worth, and the third highest net fixed assets, and households with a dynastic 
bequest motive have the second highest net worth and the fourth highest net worth and 
net fixed assets of any bequest motive.     
 
In general, it appears that households with a bequest motive (especially an intended 
bequest motive) have much higher holdings of all types of assets than households with 
no bequest motive, especially in urban areas, which suggests that bequest motives have 
the expected impact  on saving  behavior.  However,  I need to  perform a regression 
analysis  in  order  to  ascertain  whether  or  not  this  conclusion  holds  up  even  after 
controlling for other factors. 
 
c.  Data on Wealth Holdings by Age and Retirement Status 
Finally, Table 3 shows average holdings of each asset type by five-year age group and 
retirement status for urban, rural, and all households.    As we discussed in section 2, we 
would expect wealth to increase with age until retirement age if households plan to 
finance their living expenses during retirement using their own savings, but there is no 
clear trend in asset holdings by age until age 59, perhaps because the increase in wealth 
is obscured by the cohort effect in conjunction with very high rates of income growth, 
as a result of which lifetime income decreases sharply with age.    We can, however, 
observe a fairly substantial increase in holdings of all asset types in all samples from the 
20-24 age group to the 25-29 or 30-34 age group (in one case until the 35-39 age - 23 - 
 
group).     
 
Turning to trends after age 60 (the mandatory retirement age for salaried workers in 
China), there is a clear decline in holdings of all asset types from the 55-59 age group to 
the 60-64 age group in the case of the urban and rural samples and an even sharper 
decline if we compare all households in the 55-59 age group to retirees in the 60-64 age 
group in the case of the urban sample.    However, trends are less clear in the case of the 
nation-wide sample, with net financial assets and net fixed assets showing a decline 
from the 55-59 age group to the 60-64 age group, as expected (except that net fixed 
assets show an increase if all households in the 55-59 age group are compared to retired 
households in the 60-64 age group), but with net worth showing an increase, contrary to 
expectation. 
 
Moreover, there is a slight increase in holdings of all asset types in all samples from the 
60-64 age group to the 65-and-over age group, contrary to expectation, whether we look 
at all households or retired households except in the case of net financial assets in the 
sample of all rural households and in the nation-wide sample of retired households.   
 
Thus, age-wealth profiles show a mixed picture, with some evidence in favor of the 
life-cycle model and some evidence against it.    A definitive verdict must await the 
results of my regression analysis, which controls for the impact of other variables.    It is 
to such an analysis that I turn in the next section. 
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7.  Estimation  Results  concerning  the  Determinants  of  the  Saving  Behavior  of 
Aged Households 
 
In  this  section,  I  present  the  estimation  results  of  my  regression  analysis  of  the 
determinants  of  the  saving  behavior  of  the  aged.  Tables  4-6  show  the  estimation 
results for urban households, rural households and all households, respectively.   
 
Model 1 of Tables 4-6 shows the estimation results with bequest motive dummies in 
isolation, model 2 shows the estimation results with the cross-products of the bequest 
motive dummies and the age of the male household head only, and model 3 shows the 
estimation  results  including  both  the  bequest  motive  dummies  in  isolation  and  the 
cross-products of the bequest motive dummies and the age of the male household head.   
I discuss the estimation results of the models with both the bequest motive dummies in 
isolation and the cross-product terms first, then the models with only the bequest motive 
dummies in isolation, and lastly the models with only the cross-product terms. 
 
a.  Estimation Results for Urban Households (Table 4) 
(1) Estimation Results based on Net Worth 
Turning  first  to  the  estimation  results  based  on  net  worth  and  looking  first  at  the 
estimation results for model (3), which contains the age of the male household head as 
well as the cross-products of the bequest motive dummies and the  age of the male 
household head, the coefficients of most of the bequest dummies entered in isolation are - 25 - 
 
not significant, indicating that the level of net  worth of  aged households with most 
bequest motives is not significantly different from that of aged households without a 
bequest motive.    The only bequest motive dummy whose coefficient is significant is 
one of the two selfish bequest dummies (SBEQUEST2).    Its coefficient is negative and 
significant, which indicates that the level of net worth of aged households planning to 
leave a bequest only if their children provide financial assistance is significantly lower 
than that of those without a bequest motive, as expected. 
 
Since  both  HAGE,  the  age  of  the  male  household  head,  and  the  cross-products  of 
HAGE and the bequest motive dummies are included in the regression equation, the 
coefficient  of  the  age  of  the  male  household  head  measures  the  annual  rate  of 
accumulation or decumulation of the net worth of aged households without a bequest 
motive.    The coefficient of HAGE is negative but not significant, suggesting that aged 
households without a bequest motive do not accumulate or decumulate their net worth.           
 
The  coefficient  of  the  cross-products  of  HAGE  and  the  bequest  motive  dummies 
indicates  by  how  much  the  annual  rate  of  accumulation  of  the  net  worth  of  aged 
households with a bequest motive exceeds that of aged households without a bequest 
motive.    Most  of  the  coefficients  of  these  cross-product  terms  are  not  significant, 
indicating that the annual rate of accumulation of the net worth of aged households with 
a bequest motive does not significantly differ from that of aged households without a 
bequest motive.    The only cross-product term whose coefficient is significant is SBA2.   
Its  coefficient  is  positive  and  significant,  which  indicates  that  the  annual  rate  of - 26 - 
 
accumulation of the net worth of aged households planning to leave a bequest only if 
their  children  provide  financial  assistance  is  significantly  higher  than  that  of  those 
without  a  bequest  motive,  as  expected.    Moreover,  since  the  annual  rate  of 
accumulation of households with a bequest motive can be computed as the sum of the 
coefficient of HAGE in isolation and the coefficient of the cross-product of HAGE and 
the  bequest  motive  dummy  and  since  the  coefficient  of  HAGE  in  isolation  is 
insignificant, the aforementioned result suggests that aged households with a selfish 
bequest motive relating to financial assistance continue accumulating net worth even 
after retirement. 
 
Turning next to the estimation results for model (1), which contains only the bequest 
motive dummies in isolation, the coefficients of three out of the five bequest motive 
dummies  (the  altruistic  bequest  motive  dummy  (ABEQUEST)  and  the  two  selfish 
bequest motive dummies (SBEQUEST1 and SBEQUEST2)) are positive and significant, 
indicating that the level of net  worth  of  aged  households  with  an altruistic bequest 
motive or a selfish bequest motive is significantly higher than that of those without a 
bequest motive.    However, differences among the three coefficients are not statistically 
significant. 
 
Turning  next  to  the  estimation  results  for  model  (2),  which  contains  only  the 
cross-products of the bequest motive dummies and the age of the male household head, 
the  coefficient  of  HAGE,  the  age  of  the  male  household  head,  is  positive  but 
insignificant,  suggesting  that  aged  households  without  a  bequest  motive  do  not - 27 - 
 
accumulate or decumulate net worth. 
 
Three out of the five coefficients of the cross-products of HAGE and the bequest motive 
dummies (ABA, SBA1 and SBA2) are significant, indicating that the annual rate of 
accumulation of the net worth of aged households with an altruistic or selfish bequest 
motive is significantly higher than that of aged households without a bequest motive, as 
expected.    Moreover,  since  the  annual  rate  of  accumulation  of  households  with  a 
bequest motive can be computed as the sum of the coefficient of HAGE in isolation and 
the coefficient of the cross-product of HAGE and the bequest motive dummy and since 
the coefficient of HAGE in isolation is insignificant, the aforementioned result suggests 
that aged households with an altruistic or selfish bequest motive continue accumulating 
net worth even after retirement. 
 
Turning to the coefficients of the other explanatory variables, the coefficient of parental 
income is positive and significant in all three models, and since parental income can be 
regarded as a proxy for lifetime income, this result suggests that aged households with 
higher lifetime incomes have higher net worth than aged households with lower lifetime 
incomes.    The  coefficient  of  the  male  household  head’s  educational  attainment  is 
positive and significant in all three models, suggesting that aged households with higher 
educational  attainments  have  higher  net  worth  than  those  with  lower  educational 
attainments.  Finally,  the  coefficients  of  the  housing  price  index,  the  marital  status 
dummy, and the age difference between husband and wife are not significant. 
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(2) Estimation Results based on Net Financial Assets 
Turning next to the estimation results based on net financial assets and looking first at 
the estimation results for model (3), the coefficients of most of the bequest dummies 
entered in isolation are not significant, indicating that the level of net financial assets of 
aged households with most bequest motives is not significantly different from that of 
aged households without a bequest motive.    The only bequest motive dummies whose 
coefficients  are  significant  are  the  two  selfish  bequest  dummies  (SBEQUEST1  and 
SBEQUEST2).    Their coefficients are negative and significant, which indicates that 
the level of net worth of aged households planning to leave a bequest only if their 
children provide care or financial assistance is significantly lower than that of those 
without a bequest motive, contrary to expectation. 
 
The coefficient of  HAGE,  the age of the male  household  head, is  negative but  not 
significant,  suggesting  that  aged  households  without  a  bequest  motive  do  not 
accumulate or decumulate their net financial assets.           
 
Two out of the five coefficients of the cross-products of HAGE and the bequest motive 
dummies (SBA1 and SBA2) are positive and significant, indicating that the annual rate 
of  accumulation  of  the  net  financial  assets  of  aged  households  planning  to  leave  a 
bequest only if their children provide care or financial assistance is significantly higher 
than that of those without a bequest motive, as expected.  Moreover, since the annual 
rate of accumulation of households with a bequest motive can be computed as the sum 
of  the  coefficient  of  HAGE  in  isolation  and  the  coefficient  of  the  cross-product  of - 29 - 
 
HAGE and the bequest motive dummy and since the coefficient of HAGE in isolation is 
insignificant, the aforementioned result suggests that aged households with a selfish 
bequest motive continue accumulating net worth even after retirement. 
 
Turning  next  to  model  (1),  the  coefficients  of  the  altruistic  bequest  motive  dummy 
(ABEQUEST), one of the two selfish bequest motive dummies (SBEQUEST1), and the 
dynastic bequest motive dummy (DBEQUEST) are positive and significant, indicating 
that the level of net worth of aged households with an altruistic, selfish, or dynastic 
motive is significantly higher than that of aged households without a bequest motive, as 
expected. 
 
The  coefficient  of  HAGE,  the  age  of  the  male  household  head,  is  positive  but 
insignificant,  suggesting that aged households do not  accumulate or decumulate net 
worth. 
 
Turning next to the estimation results for model (2), the coefficient of HAGE, the age of 
the male household head, is positive but insignificant, suggesting that aged households 
without a bequest motive do not accumulate or decumulate net worth.   
 
The coefficients of three out of the five cross-products of HAGE and the bequest motive 
dummies (ABA, SBA2 and DBA) are positive and significant, indicating that the annual 
rate of accumulation of net  financial assets of  aged households planning to leave a - 30 - 
 
bequest  to  their  children  no  matter  what  or  only  if  their  children  provide  financial 
assistance  or  carry  on  the  family  business  is  significantly  higher  than  that  of  aged 
households without a bequest motive, as expected.    Moreover, since the annual rate of 
accumulation of households with a bequest motive can be computed as the sum of the 
coefficient of HAGE in isolation and the coefficient of the cross-product of HAGE and 
the  bequest  motive  dummy  and  since  the  coefficient  of  HAGE  in  isolation  is 
insignificant, the aforementioned result suggests that aged households with an altruistic, 
selfish,  or  dynastic  bequest  motive  continue  accumulating  net  worth  even  after 
retirement. 
 
Turning to the coefficients of the other explanatory variables, the coefficient of the male 
household head’s educational attainment is positive and significant in all three models, 
meaning  that  aged  households  with  a  higher  educational  attainment  hold  more  net 
financial assets than aged households a lower educational attainment.    The coefficients 
of parental income, the housing price index, the marital status dummy, and the age 
difference between husband and wife are not significant. 
 
(3) Estimation Results based on Net Fixed Assets 
Turning finally to the estimation results based on net fixed assets and looking first at the 
estimation  results  for  model  (3),  none  of  the  coefficients  of  the  bequest  dummies 
entered  in  isolation  are  significant,  indicating  that  the  level  of  net  worth  of  aged 
households  with  a  bequest  motive  is  not  significantly  different  from  that  of  aged 
households without a bequest motive. - 31 - 
 
 
The  coefficient  of  HAGE,  the  age  of  the  male  household  head,  is  positive  but  not 
significant,  suggesting  that  aged  households  without  a  bequest  motive  do  not 
accumulate or decumulate net fixed assets, and the coefficients of the cross-product 
terms of HAGE and the bequest motive dummies are not significant either, indicating 
that the annual rate of accumulation of the net fixed assets of aged households with a 
bequest motive does not differ significantly from that of aged households without a 
bequest motive. 
 
Turning next to the estimation results for model (1), the coefficients of three out of the 
five  bequest  motive  dummies  (ABEQUEST,  SBEQUEST1,  and  SBEQUEST2)  are 
positive and significant when entered in isolation, indicating that the level of net fixed 
assets of aged households with an altruistic or selfish bequest motive are significantly 
higher than that of aged households without a bequest motive.    However, differences 
among the three coefficients are not statistically significant. 
 
The  coefficient  of  HAGE,  the  age  of  the  male  household  head,  is  positive  but 
insignificant, suggesting that aged households continue accumulating net fixed assets 
even after retirement, contrary to expectation. 
 
Turning next to the estimation results for model (2), the coefficient of HAGE, the age of 
the male household head, is positive and significant, suggesting that aged households 
without a bequest motive continue accumulating net fixed assets even after retirement, - 32 - 
 
contrary to expectation. 
 
The coefficients of three out of the five cross-products of HAGE and the bequest motive 
dummies  (ABA,  SBA1  and  SBA2)  are  positive  and  significant,  indicating  that  the 
annual rate of accumulation of the net worth of aged households planning to leave a 
bequest to their children no matter what or only if their children provide care and/or 
financial  assistance  is  significantly  higher  than  that  of  aged  households  without  a 
bequest motive, as expected.    However, differences among the three coefficients are 
not statistically significant.  Since the annual rate of accumulation of households with 
a bequest motive can be computed as the sum of the coefficient of HAGE in isolation 
and the coefficient of the cross-product of HAGE and the bequest motive dummy and 
since the coefficient of HAGE is positive and significant, our results imply that aged 
households with an altruistic or selfish bequest motive continue accumulating net worth 
even after retirement. 
 
Turning  to  the  coefficients  of  the  other  explanatory  variables,  the  coefficients  of 
parental income and the male household head’s educational attainment are positive and 
significant in all three models, as in the case of net worth.    Moreover, the coefficient of 
the  housing  price  index  is  also  positive  and  significant  in  all  three  models,  which 
implies that aged households that live in an area with high housing prices accumulate 
their net fixed assets more rapidly than aged households that live in an area with low 
housing prices.    The coefficients of the marital status dummy and the age difference 
between husband and wife are not significant.         - 33 - 
 
 
b.  Estimation Results for Rural Households (Table 5) 
(1) Estimation Results based on Net Worth and Net Fixed Assets 
Turning  next  to  the  estimation  results  for  rural  households  and  looking  first  at  the 
estimation results based on net worth and net fixed assets, none of the coefficients of the 
bequest motive dummies entered in isolation, HAGE (the age of the male household 
head), and the cross-products of HAGE and the bequest motive dummies are significant 
in any of the three models, indicating that the level of net worth and net fixed assets of 
aged households with bequest motives is not significantly different from that of those 
without  a  bequest  motive,  that  aged  households  without  a  bequest  motive  do  not 
accumulate or decumulate their net worth or net fixed assets, and that the annual rate of 
accumulation of the net worth or net fixed assets of aged households with a bequest 
motive does not differ significantly from that of aged households without a bequest 
motive. 
 
(2) Estimation Results based on Net Financial Assets 
Turning next to the estimation results based on net financial assets and looking first at 
the  estimation  results  for  model  (3),  the  results  are  clearest  in  this  case.  The 
coefficients  of  three  out  of  the  five  bequest  motive  dummies  (SBEQUEST1, 
SBEQUEST2, and UBEQUEST) are negative and significant, indicating that the level 
of net  financial assets of aged households planning to leave a bequest only if their 
children provide care or financial assistance and of aged households not planning to 
make  special  efforts  to  leave  an  inheritance  to  their  children  but  planning  to  leave - 34 - 
 
whatever is left over is significantly lower than that of those without a bequest motive, 
contrary to expectation. 
 
The  coefficient  of  HAGE,  the  age  of  the  male  household  head,  is  negative  and 
significant, indicating that aged households decumulate their net financial assets after 
retirement, as expected.         
 
The coefficients of three out of the five cross-products of HAGE and the bequest motive 
dummies  (SBA1,  SBA2  and  UBA)  are  positive  and  significant,  indicating  that  the 
annual rate of accumulation of the net financial assets of aged households planning to 
leave a bequest only if their children provide care and/or financial assistance or not 
planning to make special efforts to leave an inheritance to their children but planning to 
leave whatever is left over is significantly higher than that of those without a bequest 
motive,  as  expected.  However,  differences  among  the  three  coefficients  are  not 
statistically significant.    Since the annual rate of accumulation of households with a 
bequest motive can be computed as the sum of the coefficient of HAGE in isolation and 
the coefficient of the cross-product of HAGE and the bequest motive dummy and since 
the coefficient of HAGE in isolation is negative and significant and smaller in absolute 
magnitude than the coefficients of SBA1 and SBA2 and almost identical in absolute 
magnitude  to  the  coefficient  of  UBA,  the  aforementioned  results  suggest  that  aged 
households with a selfish bequest motive continue  accumulating net financial assets 
after retirement and that aged households with an unexpected bequest motive neither 
accumulate nor decumulate net financial assets even after retirement. - 35 - 
 
 
Turning to the coefficients of the other explanatory variables, the coefficient of parental 
income is positive and significant  and the coefficient of the age difference between 
husband and wife is negative and significant in the case of all three dependent variables 
and all three models.    The latter result is contrary to expectation because a larger age 
difference  means  a  longer  retirement  period  and  hence  should  increase  rather  than 
decreasing  wealth  holdings.    Finally,  the  coefficient  of  the  dummy  variable  for  the 
employment status of the male household head is negative and significant in the case of 
net worth and net fixed assets, implying that the net worth and net fixed assets of aged 
households who are still working is lower than those of aged households who are not 
working. The coefficients of the male household head’s educational attainment and the 
marital  status  dummy  are  not  significant  in  the  case  of  any  of  the  three  dependent 
variables and any of the three models. 
 
c.    Estimation Results for the Pooled Sample (Table 6)   
Turning  finally  to  the  estimation  results  for  the  pooled  sample  of  urban  and  rural 
households, the results are very similar to the estimation results for urban households 
only  and  thus  I  will  discuss  only  the  differences  relative  to  the  results  for  urban 
households. 
 
(1) Estimation Results based on Net Worth 
Looking first at the estimation results based on net worth, the estimation results for 
model (3) are very similar to the estimation results for urban households only while the - 36 - 
 
estimation results for models (1) and (2) are somewhat different, with the coefficients of 
ABEQUEST, SBEQUEST1 and SBEQUEST2 being positive and significant in the case 
of urban households only and the coefficients of ABEQUEST and DBEQUEST being 
positive  and  significant  in  the  case  of  the  pooled  sample  in  model  (1)  and  the 
coefficients of ABA, SBA1, and SBA2 being positive and significant in the case of 
urban households only and the coefficients of ABA, DBA, and UBA being significant in 
the case of the pooled sample in model (2). 
 
(2) Estimation Results based on Net Financial Assets   
Turning to the estimation results based on net financial assets, the estimation results are 
very similar to those for urban households, with the only difference being that, in the 
case of model (2), the coefficients of ABA, SBA2, and DBA are positive and significant 
in the case of urban households but that the coefficients of ABA, SBA1, SBA2, and 
DBA are positive and significant in the case of the pooled sample. 
 
(3) Estimation Results based on Net Fixed Assets 
Turning finally to the estimation results based on net financial assets, the estimation 
results are generally similar to those for urban households, with the only differences 
being that, in the case of model (1), the coefficients of ABEQUEST, SBEQUEST1, 
SBEQUEST2, and HAGE are positive and significant in the case of urban households 
but  that  only  the  coefficients  of  ABEQUEST  and  UBEQUEST  are  positive  and 
significant in the case of the pooled sample, and similarly, that in the case of model (2), 
the coefficients of ABA, SBA1, SBA2, and HAGE are positive and significant in the - 37 - 
 
case of urban households but that only the coefficients of ABA and UBA are positive 
and significant in the case of the pooled sample.    The only other major difference is 
that  the  coefficient  of  ADIFF  is  insignificant  in  the  case  of  urban  households  but 
negative and significant (contrary to  expectation) in  the case of the pooled sample, 
presumably  because  most  rural  households  continue  working  even  in  old  age  and 
because consumer prices are much lower in rural areas.  The coefficients of the other 
explanatory variables are very similar to those for urban households. 
 
8.  Conclusion and Policy Implications 
In this paper, I discussed the actual conditions and determinants of the saving behavior 
and wealth holdings of the aged in China,  with emphasis on the impact of bequest 
motives thereon, using micro data from the 2009 “Survey of Living Preferences and 
Satisfaction”  (urban  households)  and  the  2010  “Survey  of  Living  Preferences  and 
Satisfaction” (rural households), which were conducted in February 2009 and January 
2010, respectively, as  part of the  Global
 Center of Excellence  (GCOE) Program  on 
“Behavioral  Macro-dynamics  based  on  Surveys  and  Experiments”  of  the  Graduate 
School  of  Economics  and  the  Institute  of  Social  and  Economic  Research  of  Osaka 
University.  More specifically, I used three subsamples of older respondents (defined 
as  those  who  are  aged  60  or  old)—retired  households  living  in  urban  areas,  aged 
households living in rural areas, and the pooled sample of both—to analyze the impact 
of bequest motives and other factors on the saving behavior of aged households.     
My main findings are as follows: Bequest motives are strong in China, with more than 
87 percent of respondents in urban areas, more than 75 percent in rural areas, and more - 38 - 
 
than 85 percent in the country as a whole having a bequest motive, and these bequests 
are motivated primarily by altruism.    Moreover, I found that there is little evidence that 
aged  households  in  China  dissave  (decumulate  their  wealth)  but  that  altruistic  and 
selfish  bequest  motives,  especially  the  latter,  increase  the  saving  (or  reduce  the 
dissaving) of aged households. 
 
Turning  to  the  policy  implications  of  my  findings,  my  finding  that  bequests  are 
motivated more by altruistic motives than by selfish or exchange-related motives in 
China implies that expansionary fiscal policies such as tax cuts financed by the issuance 
of government bonds will not be very effective in  stimulating consumption because 
individuals  will  care  about  the  tax  burden  that  will  have  to  be  imposed  on  future 
generations to retire those bonds and that government redistributional policies such as 
pay-as-you-go social security systems will not necessarily be very effective because 
they will be offset by transfers in the other direction (from parents to children). 
 
Secondly,  this  finding  also  implies  that  bequests  will  not  necessarily  be  offset  by 
transfers in the other direction (from children to parents), meaning that there is a danger 
that wealth disparities will passed on from generation to generation and therefore that it 
may be desirable to introduce estate taxes. 
 
Thirdly, my finding that aged households in China do not dissave (decumulate their 
assets) very much, in large part due to the presence of bequest motives, implies that the 
household saving rate will not necessarily decline even though China’s population is - 39 - 
 
projected to age very rapidly due it large part to the one-child policy. 
 
Turning finally to directions for future research, I have already analyzed the impact of 
bequest  motives  on  parent-child  co-residence  in  China  (see  Yin  (2010)),  but  in  the 
future, I plan to analyze the impact of bequest motives on other economic decisions 
such as the labor supply and retirement decisions of parents and children’s decisions 
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Sample Variable Mean Standard  Minimum Maximum
deviation
Urban households
lnNW 12.846 0.780 8.517 14.557
NW 475423.600 314209.000 5000 2100000
lnFINA 10.752 1.001 8.517 13.305
FINA 63655.280 90416.990 0 600000
lnFIXA 12.766 0.627 10.597 14.509
FIXA 411768.300 279753.600 0 2000000
ABEQUEST 0.333 0.472 0 1
SBEQUEST1 0.118 0.323 0 1
SBEQUEST2 0.033 0.178 0 1
DBEQUEST 0.069 0.254 0 1
UBEQUEST 0.321 0.468 0 1
ABA 21.252 30.172 0 74
SBA1 7.740 21.253 0 74
SBA2 2.207 12.079 0 73
DBA 4.411 16.240 0 69
UBA 20.756 30.296 0 73
INCOME 0.042 0.067 0 0.9
ADIFF 6.817 15.201 -7 70
AGEH 64.533 3.466 60 78
EDUH 8.884 2.514 3 16
MARRY 0.939 0.240 0 1
RR 0.189 0.078 0.107 0.324
Rural households
lnNW 10.826 1.140 6.908 12.713
NW 79752.630 72407.400 -21900 332000
lnFINA 9.019 1.262 4.605 11.408
FINA 7450.000 13763.100 -29900 90000
lnFIXA 10.681 1.173 6.908 12.676
FIXA 72302.630 68792.800 1000 320000
ABEQUEST 0.307 0.463 0 1
SBEQUEST1 0.079 0.271 0 1
SBEQUEST2 0.053 0.224 0 1
DBEQUEST 0.053 0.224 0 1
UBEQUEST 0.316 0.467 0 1
ABA 19.588 29.619 0 71
SBA1 5.184 17.851 0 77
SBA2 3.281 13.985 0 64
DBA 3.228 13.758 0 63
UBA 20.132 29.813 0 70
INCOME 0.012 0.007 0 0.034
ADIFF 3.088 3.393 -2 15
AGEH 63.904 3.321 60 77
EDUH 4.421 3.071 0 12
MARRY 0.912 0.284 0 1
WORK 0.851 0.358 0 1
All households
lnNW 12.210 1.306 6.908 14.557
NW 350127.800 320933.100 -21900 2100000
lnFINA 10.333 1.301 4.605 13.305
FINA 45856.940 79525.500 -29900 600000
lnFIXA 12.095 1.288 6.908 14.509
FIXA 304270.800 282674.900 0 2000000
ABEQUEST 0.325 0.469 0 1
SBEQUEST1 0.106 0.308 0 1
SBEQUEST2 0.039 0.194 0 1
DBEQUEST 0.064 0.245 0 1
UBEQUEST 0.319 0.467 0 1
ABA 20.725 29.966 0 74
SBA1 6.931 20.248 0 77
SBA2 2.547 12.703 0 73
DBA 4.036 15.488 0 69
UBA 20.558 30.104 0 73
INCOME 0.032 0.057 0 0.9
ADIFF 5.636 12.819 -7 70
AGEH 64.333 3.429 60 78
EDUH 7.471 3.406 0 16
MARRY 0.931 0.255 0 1
DRURAL 0.317 0.466 0 1
Note: INCOME is in units of 10,000,000 yuan.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variable and Explanatory Variables
Data Source:　The data were taken from the China surveys of the “Survey of Living Preferences and Satisfaction,” which was conducted as




1. I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) 
no matter what (ABEQUEST)
2. I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) if 
they provide care (including nursing care) during 
old age (SBEQUEST1)
3．I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) 
only if they provide financial assistance during 
old age(SBEQUEST2)
4．I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) 
only if they carry on the family business 
(DBEQUEST)
5．I do not plan to make special efforts to leave 
an inheritance to my child(ren) but will leave 
whatever is left over (UBEQUEST)
Total
Bequest Motive Net Fixed Assets
1．I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) 
no matter what (ABEQUEST)
2. I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) if 
they provide care (including nursing care) during 
old age (SBEQUEST1)
3．I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) 
only if they provide financial assistance during 
old age(SBEQUEST2)
4．I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) 
only if they carry on the family business 
(DBEQUEST)
5．I do not plan to make special efforts to leave 
an inheritance to my child(ren) but will leave 
whatever is left over (UBEQUEST)
Total
Bequest Motive Net Fixed Assets
1. I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) 
no matter what (ABEQUEST)
2. I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) if 
they provide care (including nursing care) during 
old age (SBEQUEST1)
3．I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) 
only if they provide financial assistance during 
old age(SBEQUEST2)
4．I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) 
only if they carry on the family business 
(DBEQUEST)
5．I do not plan to make special efforts to leave 
an inheritance to my child(ren) but will leave 
whatever is left over (UBEQUEST)
Total
Net Worth Net Financial Assets
304,270.80  (360)
41,434.78  (23) 320,608.70  (23)
308,340.00  (115) 29,644.35  (115) 278,695.70  (115)
350,127.80  (360) 45,856.94  (360)
420,199.10  (117) 74,267.52  (117) 345,931.60  (117)
402,815.80  (38) 42,473.68  (38) 360,342.10  (38)
72,302.630  (114)
74,922.860  (35) 9,951.429  (35) 64,971.430  (35)
50,444.440  (9) 3,444.444  (9) 47,000.000  (9)
8,136.111  (36) 95,972.220  (36)
79,752.630  (114)
Table 2: Bequest Motives and Aged Households' Assets Holding (Urban Sample）
Bequest Motives and Aged Households' Assets Holding (Rural Sample）
Bequest Motives and Aged Households' Assets Holding (Pooled Sample）
65,166.670  (6) 9,500.000  (6) 55,666.670  (6)
104,108.300  (36)
567,573.20  (82) 101,719.50  (82) 465,853.70  (82)
512,172.40  (29) 54,586.21  (29) 457,586.20  (29)
721,250.00  (8) 56,250.00  (8) 665,000.00  (8)
466,823.50  (17) 52,705.88  (17) 414,117.60  (17)
401,407.60  (79) 39,445.57  (79) 361,962.00  (79)
411,768.30  (246)
59,833.330  (6) 7,666.667  (6) 52,166.670  (6)
194,594.30  (53)
402,357.10  (14)
Note: The figures in parentheses show the number of  observations, and the figures without parentheses show the 
mean of three kinds of assets.
327,193.50  (31) 41,064.52  (31) 286,129.00  (31)
475,423.60  (246) 63,655.28  (246)
6．I do not plan to leave an inheritance 
(NOBEQUEST)
220,011.30  (53) 25,416.98  (53)
65,613.640  (22)
362,043.50  (23)
Net Worth Net Financial Assets Net Fixed Assets
Net Worth Net Financial Assets
7,450.000  (114)
437,785.70  (14) 35,428.57  (14)
6．I do not plan to leave an inheritance 
(NOBEQUEST)
6．I do not plan to leave an inheritancet 
(NOBEQUEST)














































448,919.2  (146) 63,782.19  (146) 385,137.0  (146)
Note: The figures in parentheses show the number of  observations, and the figures 
without parentheses show the mean of three kinds of assets.
460,538.5  (117) 55,743.59  (117) 404,794.9  (117)
454,088.2  (263) 60,206.08  (263) 393,882.1  (264)
391,110.2  (362) 52,105.49  (364) 340,701.9  (364)
350,128.1  (2364) 52,864.50  (2372) 298,927.1  (2369)
353,910.8  (241) 54,306.58  (243) 308,282.2  (241)
370,418.2  (220) 50,082.81  (221) 320,107.7  (220)
362,515.1  (239) 43,550.42  (240) 318,782.4  (239)
372,191.3  (241) 72,402.90  (241) 299,788.4  (241)
339,180.8  (266) 47,594.36  (266) 292,554.3  (267)
305,990.2  (276) 46,975.90  (278) 262,928.1  (278)
322,143.4  (182) 64,890.66  (182) 257,252.7  (182)
354,480.5  (200) 55,560.50  (200) 298,920.0  (200)
Assets Holding by Age （Pooled Sample)
283,179.6  (137) 41,026.28  (137) 242,153.3  (137)
12,512.000  (1000) 92,506.50  (1000)
81,693.85  (65) 9,909.231  (65) 71,784.62  (65)
Net Worth Net Financial Assets Net Fixed Assets
85,850.93  (108) 7,512.963  (108) 78,337.96  (108)
105,018.50  (1000)
100,186.20  (87) 13,473.560  (87) 86,712.64  (87)
109,509.20  (109) 13,059.630  (109) 96,449.54  (109)
103,168.80  (138) 11,183.330  (138) 91,985.51  (138)
109,657.60  (99) 9,920.202  (99) 99,737.37  (99)
118,207.20  (97) 12,702.060  (97) 105,505.20  (97)
105,722.10  (131) 12,622.900  (131) 93,099.24  (131)
Net Fixed Assets
59,814.81  (108) 425,972.2  (108)
127,231.00  (100) 18,681.000  (100) 108,550.00  (100)
Assets Holding by Age （Rural Sample)
475,423.6  (246) 63,655.28  (246) 411,768.3  (246)
100,781.80  (66) 17,903.030  (66) 82,878.79  (66)
Net Worth Net Financial Assets
529,827.2  (1364) 82,275.95  (1372) 449,709.1  (1369)
467,313.0  (138) 66,660.87  (138) 400,652.2  (138)
485,787.0  (108)
491,496.1  (155) 66,821.79  (156) 424,243.2  (155)
520,905.5  (254) 70,917.97  (256) 451,386.7  (256)
525,856.5  (154) 105,694.20  (154) 420,162.3  (154)
555,727.3  (132) 87,858.21  (134) 483,204.6  (132)
508,811.6  (138) 82,257.14  (140) 431,428.6  (140)
541,321.4  (140) 67,163.12  (141) 473,678.6  (140)
576,990.3  (103) 95,922.33  (103) 481,068.0  (103)
565,722.2  (135) 81,529.63  (135) 484,676.5  (136)
Table 3: Assets Holding by Age （Urban Sample)
452,732.4  (71) 62,521.13  (71) 390,211.3  (71)
559,841.5  (82) 121,243.90  (82) 438,597.6  (82)










(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES lnNW lnNW lnNW lnFINA lnFINA lnFINA lnFIXA lnFIXA lnFIXA
ABEQUEST 0.627*** -2.256 0.668** 1.116 0.418*** 1.199
(0.212) (2.797) (0.266) (3.955) (0.130) (1.841)
SBEQUEST1 0.466* -0.291 0.283 -8.816** 0.324** -0.469
(0.244) (3.717) (0.294) (4.467) (0.164) (2.731)
SBEQUEST2 0.709** -9.111** 0.953*** -10.410** 0.525** -4.570
(0.308) (4.308) (0.319) (4.250) (0.231) (4.250)
DBEQUEST 0.364 -0.575 0.570* -2.538 0.192 2.264
(0.253) (3.984) (0.315) (5.685) (0.201) (3.554)
UBEQUEST 0.305 -2.136 0.123 -4.112 0.154 1.658
(0.218) (2.542) (0.262) (4.009) (0.136) (1.883)
HAGE 0.019 0.013 -0.013 0.015 0.008 -0.034 0.023** 0.019* 0.031
(0.016) (0.017) (0.037) (0.022) (0.022) (0.055) (0.011) (0.012) (0.024)
ABA 0.010*** 0.045 0.010** -0.007 0.006*** -0.012
(0.003) (0.044) (0.004) (0.061) (0.002) (0.029)
SBA1 0.007* 0.012 0.005 0.140** 0.005* 0.012
(0.004) (0.059) (0.004) (0.068) (0.003) (0.043)
SBA2 0.011** 0.146** 0.015*** 0.167** 0.008** 0.075
(0.005) (0.066) (0.005) (0.065) (0.003) (0.064)
DBA 0.006 0.014 0.009* 0.048 0.003 -0.032
(0.004) (0.062) (0.005) (0.089) (0.003) (0.054)
UBA 0.005 0.038 0.002 0.066 0.002 -0.023
(0.003) (0.041) (0.004) (0.061) (0.002) (0.029)
INCOME 1.495** 1.484** 1.498** 0.449 0.435 0.509 1.391** 1.386** 1.336**
(0.705) (0.704) (0.705) (1.512) (1.521) (1.515) (0.555) (0.555) (0.567)
ADIFF -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.015 -0.014 -0.006 -0.014 -0.013 -0.012
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
HEDU 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.060** 0.060** 0.056** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.037**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
MARRY -0.133 -0.102 -0.071 -1.078 -1.024 -0.568 -0.755 -0.741 -0.671
(1.022) (1.026) (1.083) (1.184) (1.180) (1.234) (0.885) (0.885) (0.907)
RR 0.937 0.931 0.869 -1.064 -1.090 -1.234 1.539*** 1.533*** 1.462**
(0.584) (0.584) (0.588) (0.848) (0.852) (0.842) (0.565) (0.564) (0.566)
Constant 10.674*** 11.051*** 12.727*** 10.192*** 10.553*** 12.852*** 11.102*** 11.351*** 10.539***
(1.063) (1.019) (2.046) (1.658) (1.614) (3.383) (0.967) (0.940) (1.462)
Observations 246 246 246 204 204 204 240 240 240
R-squared 0.141 0.143 0.154 0.121 0.120 0.156 0.171 0.172 0.182
F-stat 3.936 4.041 3.535 3.044 3.168 4.619 4.365 4.372 3.285
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1












(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES lnNW lnNW lnNW lnFINA lnFINA lnFINA lnFIXA lnFIXA lnFIXA
ABEQUEST -0.024 -1.506 0.894 -11.493 -0.183 -2.880
(0.314) (6.431) (0.697) (11.529) (0.317) (6.525)
SBEQUEST1 -0.004 -6.158 0.824 -28.615* -0.119 -6.386
(0.440) (6.193) (0.924) (16.868) (0.504) (6.045)
SBEQUEST2 -0.489 25.713 0.974 -40.811*** -0.467 24.291
(0.821) (30.158) (0.777) (9.771) (0.786) (29.178)
DBEQUEST 0.267 10.492 0.480 3.994 0.232 0.121
(0.301) (8.522) (0.775) (28.464) (0.316) (12.745)
UBEQUEST 0.339 -4.476 0.593 -16.366* 0.320 -4.421
(0.294) (5.535) (0.652) (9.007) (0.291) (5.552)
HAGE -0.026 -0.028 -0.071 -0.062 -0.072 -0.263* -0.013 -0.013 -0.066
(0.030) (0.030) (0.081) (0.047) (0.049) (0.149) (0.031) (0.031) (0.080)
ABA -0.000 0.023 0.014 0.191 -0.003 0.042
(0.005) (0.102) (0.011) (0.183) (0.005) (0.103)
SBA1 0.000 0.094 0.013 0.462* -0.001 0.096
(0.007) (0.096) (0.014) (0.269) (0.008) (0.093)
SBA2 -0.008 -0.422 0.016 0.669*** -0.008 -0.399
(0.013) (0.494) (0.012) (0.158) (0.013) (0.478)
DBA 0.004 -0.169 0.007 -0.073 0.004 -0.001
(0.005) (0.137) (0.012) (0.461) (0.005) (0.206)
UBA 0.005 0.075 0.010 0.262* 0.005 0.074
(0.005) (0.087) (0.010) (0.143) (0.005) (0.087)
INCOME 44.997*** 45.227*** 48.158*** 55.654** 55.327** 53.803** 35.931** 36.226** 37.916**
(16.982) (16.915) (16.463) (23.363) (23.467) (24.528) (17.359) (17.306) (17.025)
ADIFF -0.073** -0.074** -0.075** -0.137* -0.139* -0.156* -0.067** -0.067** -0.070**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.081) (0.080) (0.088) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
HEDU -0.026 -0.026 -0.029 0.049 0.050 0.061 -0.025 -0.025 -0.026
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
MARRY -0.219 -0.215 -0.222 -0.082 -0.079 0.050 -0.238 -0.235 -0.234
(0.299) (0.298) (0.298) (0.537) (0.533) (0.514) (0.296) (0.295) (0.298)
WORK -0.530** -0.524** -0.469* 0.076 0.075 0.187 -0.655** -0.647** -0.610**
(0.260) (0.259) (0.259) (0.360) (0.360) (0.371) (0.273) (0.272) (0.277)
Constant 12.856*** 12.957*** 15.680*** 11.722*** 12.339*** 24.600** 12.151*** 12.153*** 15.508***
(2.038) (2.042) (5.332) (3.147) (3.258) (9.666) (2.107) (2.109) (5.247)
Observations 113 113 113 65 65 65 114 114 114
R-squared 0.233 0.235 0.265 0.319 0.321 0.373 0.211 0.211 0.235
F-stat 3.565 3.590 3.129 2.360 2.374 23.62 3.019 3.051 2.159
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES lnNW lnNW lnNW lnFINA lnFINA lnFINA lnFIXA lnFIXA lnFIXA
ABEQUEST 0.452** -1.139 0.735*** 0.486 0.271* 0.956
(0.175) (2.801) (0.253) (3.587) (0.153) (2.400)
SBEQUEST1 0.298 -1.148 0.419 -9.494** 0.192 -0.697
(0.200) (3.345) (0.270) (3.833) (0.185) (3.121)
SBEQUEST2 0.383 -8.138* 1.031*** -7.109** 0.282 -5.379
(0.382) (4.907) (0.307) (3.607) (0.362) (4.781)
DBEQUEST 0.353* -0.057 0.601** -5.708 0.227 1.756
(0.200) (3.429) (0.297) (4.845) (0.184) (3.104)
UBEQUEST 0.361** -1.916 0.300 -4.750 0.274* 0.986
(0.169) (2.614) (0.244) (3.318) (0.147) (2.274)
HAGE 0.006 0.001 -0.022 -0.010 -0.018 -0.066 0.010 0.007 0.011
(0.014) (0.014) (0.034) (0.018) (0.018) (0.045) (0.013) (0.013) (0.027)
ABA 0.007** 0.025 0.011*** 0.003 0.004* -0.011
(0.003) (0.044) (0.004) (0.056) (0.002) (0.038)
SBA1 0.005 0.022 0.007* 0.153*** 0.003 0.014
(0.003) (0.052) (0.004) (0.058) (0.003) (0.048)
SBA2 0.006 0.130* 0.016*** 0.124** 0.005 0.086
(0.006) (0.073) (0.005) (0.054) (0.005) (0.071)
DBA 0.005* 0.006 0.010** 0.099 0.003 -0.024
(0.003) (0.054) (0.005) (0.076) (0.003) (0.048)
UBA 0.006** 0.035 0.005 0.078 0.004* -0.011
(0.003) (0.041) (0.004) (0.051) (0.002) (0.035)
INCOME 1.557* 1.555* 1.582* 0.695 0.688 0.783 1.344* 1.347* 1.322*
(0.931) (0.930) (0.929) (1.694) (1.702) (1.690) (0.746) (0.745) (0.756)
ADIFF -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.011* -0.011* -0.010*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
HEDU 0.038** 0.038** 0.035** 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.065*** 0.031* 0.031* 0.027
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
MARRY -0.361 -0.362 -0.354 -0.203 -0.203 -0.142 -0.435 -0.436 -0.430
(0.317) (0.318) (0.318) (0.403) (0.401) (0.389) (0.314) (0.314) (0.317)
DRURAl -1.819*** -1.820*** -1.805*** -1.437*** -1.438*** -1.368*** -1.938*** -1.938*** -1.935***
(0.143) (0.143) (0.145) (0.210) (0.209) (0.214) (0.134) (0.134) (0.137)
Constant 12.107*** 12.440*** 13.958*** 10.520*** 11.021*** 14.070*** 12.030*** 12.259*** 11.993***
(0.942) (0.936) (2.169) (1.296) (1.287) (2.948) (0.884) (0.869) (1.780)
Observations 359 359 359 269 269 269 354 354 354
R-squared 0.546 0.546 0.551 0.395 0.395 0.415 0.594 0.594 0.597
F-stat 31.19 31.41 23.64 13.84 13.93 16.41 32.73 32.78 23.03
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6:　Determinants of Aged Households' Saving of All Households